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Abstract 
 
A country needs stronger incentives to increase exploration investment in high-risk isolated 
frontier and deepwater areas. Tax consolidation is one of the possible incentives to raise 
exploration investment level in those frontier areas. Tax consolidation means that 
expenditures of non-producing contract(s) can be deducted from the income of producing 
contracts of the same contractor(s) for determination of taxable income. From the government 
point of view, the application of tax consolidation represents its current investment for future 
income.  In this study, risk analysis of the application of tax consolidation in frontier areas 
was taken with Monte Carlo simulation to identify its impact on the Government of Indonesia 
(GOI) income and on the profitability of contractor as well as quantifying the risk involves 
respectively. The result showed, that from contractor’s financial aspect, tax consolidation was 
more attractive incentive compared to increase in production sharing split. On the other hand, 
it was less attractive to the GOI, not only because it reduced GOI’s NPV, but it also posed 
high risk to the GOI. 
 
Keywords:  Tax consolidation, risk analysis, Monte Carlo simulation, production sharing 
contract 
 
Introduction 
 
Given declining tendencies on Indonesia’s geological potential especially in western part of 
Indonesia, there is increased necessity to enhance exploration activity level in other areas if it 
wants to maintain status as net exporter of petroleum resources. The remaining basins are 
found largely in eastern part of Indonesia, deep water and frontier areas, which are both riskier 
and costlier. Moreover, risk capital is in short supply and more difficult to attract, with other 
countries competing for the same investors. Therefore Indonesia needs stronger incentives to 
boost exploration investment in high-risk isolated frontier and deepwater areas.  
 
Successful development of any potential petroleum prospects in frontier and deepwater will 
require an acceptable mix of favourable reservoir performance, attractive commercial contract 
terms, sound regulations, and production technologies that can meet the challenge. Reservoir 
performance and commercial incentives are two important drivers in searching oil and gas 
resources, while technological advancements are critical for developing them economically 
(Bergman, 1999).  
 
Risk analysis of tax consolidation application 
 in frontier areas on government income 
 
The commercial risk can be reduced by the government, for example by making freely 
available exploration data and/or by financing exploration activities (Baunsgaard, 2001:6). 
Financing a portion of exploration activities can be done through tax consolidation. Tax 
consolidation means that expenditures of non-producing contract(s) can be deducted from the 
income of producing contracts of the same contractor(s) for determination of taxable income. 
Tax consolidation implies some sharing of exploration risk between the contractor and the 
government.  
 
From the government point of view, the application of tax consolidation represents its current 
investment for future income. Specifically, it represents the reinvestment of a certain portion 
of government’s current oil and gas revenues today to raise the level of exploration activity in 
achieving future profit. Hence tax consolidation is one of the possible incentives to be offered 
to raise exploration level in those frontier areas. 
 
At the moment, tax consolidation is not allowed to be applied in petroleum contracts in 
Indonesia. As stated in the Oil and Gas Law Number 22/2001, the Indonesian PSC ring-fences 
the contract, which means that all costs associated with a given block or contract must be 
recovered from revenues generated within that block or contract (Yuwono, 1998). In reality, a 
form of tax consolidation is already applied to producing contracts in Indonesia. Although the 
number of non producing active and terminated contracts in Indonesia is almost five times 
more than the number of producing contracts, the total exploration expenditures of producing 
contracts are higher than those of non-producing active and terminated contracts. Exploration 
activities in producing contracts are higher due to several reasons such as cheaper exploration 
cost per well, lower risk, and ability to deduct exploration expenditures from revenues before 
tax is counted (tax-consolidation).  
 
Conversely, it is different in non-producing contracts. The risk and the cost of exploration in 
new areas are higher than the ones in a producing contract.  In addition, Indonesia requires 
each contract to be administered by a separate new company. This restricts consolidation and 
effectively erects a ring fence around each contract area. This condition gives additional 
burden to exploration activity in non-producing contracts, and it is shown in the actual total 
exploration expenditures, which are much lower than the ones in producing contracts. 
Incentives are needed to increase exploration activity level in new areas outside the producing 
areas. 
 
Some countries had been successful in applying tax consolidation. United Kingdom, after 
applying tax consolidation in 1983 as part of its tax reform, realized a rapid recovery from 
severe drilling slump in 1978-1981 and enjoyed increased discoveries, which added an 
average of one billion barrels per year oil reserves through 1992 (IPA, 1995:4). In addition to 
UK, around thirty other countries had applied tax consolidation in their petroleum ventures, 
including, Norway, France, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Nigeria, Congo, Ghana, 
Australia, Brunei, China, India, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Philippine, Turkey, Argentina, 
Canada, USA, Mexico, Peru and others (IPA, 1995:4).  
 
These give compelling reasons to investigate the possibility of applying tax consolidation to 
Indonesian PSC terms. Risk analysis for the impacts of applying tax consolidation on the 
Government of Indonesia (GOI) income and on the profitability of contractor needs to be 
taken.  
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Literature review 
 
Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Analysis 
 
Uncertainty and risk refer to the outcomes and their implications of some future event, but 
they have very different technical meanings. Risk is the chance of injury, damage, or loss; the 
degree of probability of loss; or the amount of possible loss. Risk will be reserved to describe 
the potential gains or losses associated with particular outcomes. While uncertainty is the 
quality or state of being uncertain, lack of certainty, doubt. Uncertainty will describe and refer 
to the range of possible outcome (Murtha, 1995). 
 
Due to its link to probability; risk can be accommodated through the purchase of insurance or 
hedging. For example, we do not know if we will be in an automobile accident next year, 
however, since the probability of being in an accident is known, to protect against that 
unfortunate outcome we can buy insurance. On the other hand uncertainty is the lack of 
knowledge concerning the probability distribution of future events. Insurance is unavailable to 
protect against negative outcomes. Therefore, it is vital that the analyst must incorporate 
uncertainty into their analysis and that the decision maker incorporates uncertainty into the 
decision process. A lack of knowledge does not put off making assumptions concerning 
potential outcomes that should be taken into consideration. Even so, uncertainty is an element 
of almost all decision process.  
 
Generally any change, good or bad, includes some risk. Once the risks have been identified, a 
model can help to quantify the risks. Quantifying risk means putting a value or price on risk, 
to help someone decide whether a risk is worth taking. Risk analysis is any form of analysis 
that studies and efforts to quantify risks associated with an investment. The general objective 
of risk analysis is describing the range of possible outcome and their consequences. Risk 
analysis is a future-oriented activity, which is trying to forecast or guess events yet to come. 
One of the main reasons for this activity is to compare alternative investments (Murtha, 
1997:37). 
 
The risk analysis consists of estimating something with range of values rather than with a 
single value. For example, it is better reported that the NPV of a petroleum project is a normal 
distribution with a mean of 34 million and a standard deviation of 1.7 million USD than 
reported in single point estimation such as of 34 million USD. 
 
Usually random variables are used to describe future events whose outcomes are uncertain. 
Random variable is any variable that has a probability distribution frequency (PDF) or a 
cumulative distribution frequency (CDF) that defines it.  PDF and CDF of A are graphs that 
tell about how the values of A are distributed.  
 
Some types of PDF are widely applicable in the petroleum industry (see Figure 1), such as 
(Murtha, 1995 and Crystal Ball, 2005): 
a) The Normal Distribution PDF. The Normal Distribution describes many natural 
phenomena such as IQ’s, people heights, inflation rate, or error in measurements. It is 
a continuous probability distribution. The parameters are mean and standard 
deviation. There are three conditions underlying normal distribution: first some value 
of the unknown variable is the most likely (the mean of the distribution); second the 
unknown variable is equally likely to have value above or below of the mean 
(symmetrical about the mean); and third the unknown variable is more likely to be 
close to the mean than far away. 
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b) The Triangular Distribution PDF. In some sense, the triangular distribution is merely 
a simple description of variable, which is more likely to attain values near its mode 
than near the extremes. It is a continuous probability distribution. The parameters are 
the minimum, the most likely and the maximum. There are three conditions 
underlying the triangular distribution, the minimum and the maximum number of 
items must be fixed and the most likely number of items falls between the minimum 
and maximum values, forming a triangular shape of distribution.  
c) The Uniform Distribution is completely specified by giving its minimum and 
maximum values. There is no mode for the uniform distributions and the median 
equals the mean. In the uniform distribution, any values between the maximum and 
the minimum are equally likely to occur. It is a continuous probability distribution. 
There are three conditions underlying uniform distribution, the minimum value is 
fixed, the maximum value is fixed and all values between minimum and maximum 
are equally likely to occur. 
d) The Binomial Distribution PDF is an example of a discrete distribution. A random 
variable X that is binomially distributed counts the number of successes in n 
independent trials where p is the probability of success on each trial. When p = ½ the 
binomial distribution is symmetric.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    a) Normal                          b) Triangular              
 
 
 
 
 
 
     d) Binomial                         e) Log Normal            
Figure 1:  Some type of Probability Distrib
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and error clustering in communication circuit. It is a continuous probability 
distribution. The parameters are location and shape. 
 
Risk analysis using Monte Carlo simulation 
 
One method to carry out risk analysis is by using Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo is a 
technique to calculate the uncertainty in a forecast of future event. The method was named 
Monte Carlo for its similarity with roulette game, a simple random number generator. It is 
effective in assessing risk and modelling uncertainty. Monte Carlo simulation allows us to 
replace uncertain quantities in spreadsheet models with reasonable estimates ranges and then 
see more accurately how that uncertainty affects the outcome of the model. It provides 
information concerning the best and the worst-case range of outcomes or probability of 
reaching specific targets. 
 
This simulation involves approximation of the distribution of possible outcome of certain 
combinations of random variables, of which each has its own probability distribution function, 
through statistical sampling. This method is often used when the model is complex, non-
linear, or involves more than just a couple uncertain parameters. A simulation can typically 
involve over 10,000 evaluations of the model, a task that in the past was only practical using 
super computers.  
 
At each trial, the method will sample the distribution of each variable randomly and then 
calculate the outcome. As the number of trials increases, the distribution of experiment results 
will approximate the probability distribution function of the outcome. This distribution of the 
outcome will cater to questions such as the likelihood a certain project will generate NPV 
more than 100 million USD, a certain reservoir has 90% chance to have oil in place bigger 
than 100 million STB and others. These kinds of answers will help in assessing the risk of 
certain outcome. 
 
Figure 2 shows an example of an application of Monte Carlo simulation to estimate a simple 
equation of F = X*Y. At each trial, the distribution function of the input parameters X and Y 
are sampled, the realizations of X and Y of the trial are then multiplied to calculate F. The trial 
process is then repeated multiple times, if the number of trials is sufficient enough then 
histogram of the trial results is the approximation of the distribution function of F.  
 
The strength of Monte Carlo simulation are its universal applicability, the result contains 
maximum information about possible outcomes and the methods itself leads to sensitivity 
analysis. The advantages of the simulation include ability to sample the full range of each 
uncertain input parameter and to use it in generating the probabilistic model outcome. The 
second advantage is easy to implement, any input-output model can be utilised in the Monte 
Carlo process without making any modifications to the original model. The third advantage is 
that the Monte Carlo approach is conceptually simple and easy to explain. 
 
Monte Carlo simulation starts with development of a model, i.e., one or more equations, 
together with assumptions and logic relating the parameter in the equation. After the model 
was developed, the second step is determining the influencing factors/variables, which may 
cause the largest affects against the outcome. Then to analyse and identify the inter 
relationship between each factors. This procedure is done by either using expert opinion or 
historical data information.  
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Figure 2:  Schematic Example of Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
The third step is to determine the input values for each variable above to be applied in the 
model. The input values for each variables above is in distribution form. Therefore, 
determining the most suitable distribution for each variable based on historical information or 
expert opinion has to be done. Lognormal distributions are often used for many of the 
volumetric model input, while triangular distributions are also fairly common and are easy to 
adapt because they can be symmetric or skewed either left or right. In the case there are 
sufficient historical data, they can be used to determine the suitable distribution. Expert 
opinion is only used to determine the distribution in the case there are not enough information 
available. Finally the fourth step is to run the model using Monte Carlo software to shape the 
probability distribution of the outcomes. Sensitivity analysis then will be drawn as the final 
step (Murtha, 1997:2-3).   
 
A petroleum E&P venture is characterised as high risk and uncertainty venture. There are 
many uncertainties related to it, such as uncertainty on the existence of petroleum resources, 
uncertainties on the type and volume of hydrocarbons accumulation in case of discovery, price 
variation, lift costs variation due to different complexities of each accumulation, as well as 
other uncertainties. Therefore investment decision-making in this venture faces complex 
situation. As example due to its uncertainties, it is difficult to choose the accurate assumptions 
to forecast the profiles of input variables of the model such as production, cost, price and 
others in doing the cash flow analysis.  
 
As mentioned earlier, under Monte Carlo simulation each input variable has its own 
probability distribution and the probability distribution of the outcome will cater to questions 
such as the probability a certain project has 80% chance will generate NPV more than 100 
million USD and other.  Moreover this method is often used when the model is complex, non-
linear, or involves more than just a couple uncertain parameters. It also has many advantages 
and strength as already mentioned earlier. These facts imply that this method is appropriate to 
be used in making risk analysis in petroleum E&P venture. 
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Rate of return on investment  
 
Jones, (1993:7-12), Seba (1998:155-189), and Newendrop (2000:16-46) recommended three 
parameters to determine the profitability of certain petroleum E&P project proposal, namely 
Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Payback Period (POT).   
Net Present Value (NPV), which is derived by discounting a project’s cash receipts using the 
required discount rate, summing them over the lifetime of the proposal and deducting the 
investment outlay. Each company has its discount rate. In the mineral investment, 
expenditures would be credited through the whole life of the project, so the NPV of the project 
is as follows: 
 
 
     n             Rt                   n          Ct 
 NPV   =   Σ    -------------   -   Σ    ------------           
                        
t=1      (1  +  k )t          t=1   (1  +  k )t 
 
where: Ct  :  initial cash outlay on the project 
 Rt  :  net cash flow at time t 
 n    :  project life 
 k    :  discount rate 
 
If the present value of net in cash flow in the future is higher than the present value of 
investment (NPV > 0), the project is financially feasible because it is profitable.  If the present 
value of net in cash flow on the future is lower than the present value of investment (NPV< 0) 
the project is financially not feasible because it is not profitable.  
 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), is defined as the rate of discount, which equates the present 
value of the stream of net receipts with the initial outlay (NPV = 0): 
 
   n       Rt                     n             Ct 
Σ       -------------    =     Σ       --------------                  
 t=1     (1  +  r )t              t=1        (1  + r ) t 
 
where: Ct  :  initial cash outlay on the project 
 Rt  :  net cash flow at time t 
 n    :  project life 
 r    :  the internal rate of return 
 
In general the IRR will be compared to the relevant levels of company’s minimum required of rate of 
return. Each company has its minimum required rate of return. If the IRR is higher than the company’s 
minimum required rate of return, the investment is profitable and financially feasible. If it is lower, the 
investment is not profitable and financially is not feasible.   
 
In the treatment of uncertainty and risks in petroleum E&P venture, most investors are risk averse; 
he/she will choose the less risky project than the more risky project with the same net present value. The 
risk premium depends on the riskiness of the project. Higher risks must be balanced with higher rate. 
This risk premium represents the company’s required compensation for taking the risk. The size of the 
risk premium is affected by actions of the government, and will be lower if commercial and political risk 
can be reduced. The commercial risk can be reduced by the government, for example by making 
exploration data freely available or by financing exploration activities. While strengthening the 
macroeconomic and fiscal stability are required to reduce the political risks (Baunsgaard, 2001:6). Jones 
(1993:11) recommended the minimum required rate of return of the investment on petroleum E&P 
project as follows: 
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High risk     : 30% - 40% 
Medium risk: 20% - 30% 
Low risk      : 15% – 25% 
 
The POT is the time needed for all investment outflows to be compensated by back inflows, 
the formula as follows: 
Σ Cash inflow  -  Σ Cash outflow  =  0                  
 
Uncertainty increases over time. A way to reduce this uncertainty is by giving the company 
high profit in the early of production activity (Siebert, 1984:30) that shortens pay out time 
(POT) of its investment. Shorter POT is better, because the cash-outflow can be paid out in 
shorter time, and in turn can be invested in other projects. 
 
Methodology  
 
The Monte Carlo simulations were drawn to identify the impact of tax consolidation 
application in frontier areas to GOI income and contractor’s profitability as well as to quantify 
the risks involve and compared it with the impact of increasing the contractor’s production 
sharing split. The tax consolidation application was set up strictly to improve the exploration 
activities in frontier area only.  
 
Two simulations were drawn, as follows: 
a) Single commercial contract analysis, 
b) Aggregate combined contracts analysis. 
 
Single commercial contract analysis 
 
To compare how tax consolidation application in frontier area affected the GOI’s income and 
contractor’s profitability in case of a commercial discovery on a PSC contract, single 
commercial contract analysis was considered. Six possible scenarios combining tax 
consolidation and increasing contractor’s production sharing split were investigated: 
(a) 65/35 production sharing split without tax consolidation (fifth incentives package 
figures) as the base case, 
(b) 65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation,   
(c) 60/40 production sharing split without tax consolidation, 
(d) 60/40 production sharing split with tax consolidation, 
(e) 55/45 production sharing split without tax consolidation, 
(f) 55/45 production sharing split with tax consolidation. 
 
The financial model of the PSC contracts followed the Indonesian PSC Diagram Flow and 
Financial Model as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Other than the contractor production 
sharing split and the tax consolidation above, the assumptions of the other PSC variables were 
set up the same as the highest figures of the fifth incentives package variables summarised in 
Table 1. They were as follows: the signature bonus was 26.6 million USD; the FTP of 10%; 
the investment credit of 102.14%; the depreciation of five years double declining balance; the 
DMO price of 25% of export price; the DMO holiday price of five years and the tax rate of 
44%. 
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The first assumption was the tax consolidation was applicable strictly to cover exploration 
cost in frontier areas only. Duration of each activity was set up at one life cycle of PSC 
contract, 30 years. The exploration phase of each contract was assumed to be performed in the 
first 3 years, followed by development phase, if there was commercial discovery, which 
covers year 4 to year 8.  
 
The input variables were the total additional contract in frontier area/year, the exploration 
cost, the tax rate, discovery outcome, the commerciality of discovery, the reserve discovery 
size, the development costs (capital and non capital costs), the production costs, the 
production type, the production profile and the oil prices. How the probability distributions of 
these input variables were established is described below. 
 
The probability distribution of exploration expenditures for each area was assumed to be 
uniform distribution with minimum and maximum values of 140.9 million USD and 200 
million USD respectively. The minimum value was set up at the minimum exploration 
commitment as stated in the IP5 terms (140.9 million USD), while the maximum value was 
set up at roughly three times the historical maximum exploration expenditures cash out in 
2003 (BP Migas, 2004). All values were at 2004 value.  
 
The tax rate was assumed similar to the IP5 terms of 44%. In the scenarios with tax 
consolidation, the tax consolidation cost to government was assumed as tax rate times the total 
exploration cost. In contrast there was no cost in the scenario without tax consolidation, the 
GOI income was the total GOI take in the entire scenarios. Therefore in the scenarios with tax 
consolidation, the tax consolidation cost to GOI was 44% of the total exploration expenditures 
while the remaining 56% of total exploration expenditures was the cost for contractors. The 
exploration expenditures were distributed evenly from the first to third years of the contract. It 
was assumed in single commercial contract analysis that the minimum commercial reserve 
size was 150 millions barrels of oil (Conoco Phillip, 2004).  
 
The development cost per barrel, if there was commercial discovery, was assumed to have 
uniform probability distribution with minimum and maximum values of 6 and 9 USD per 
barrel respectively. The minimum value was set up at the 2004’s average of development cost 
of 24 US petroleum companies that operated in eastern hemisphere (not including Middle East 
area), while the maximum value was set up at the 2004’s average of development cost of 
world operation of 24 US petroleum companies (EIA, 2006:34). Half of the development cost 
was assumed to be capital expenditures. In the case of commercial discovery, the development 
cost was distributed evenly from year 4 to year 8 and escalated by 3% per year. This value 
was an average of the annual changes of US Consumer Price Index during 1990 to 2003. 
 
The production costs were divided into two types, fixed production cost and variable 
production cost. Fixed production cost represented the expenses that were independent of 
production rate, while variable production cost represented the expenses that were dependent 
on the production rate of the field. The fixed production cost was assumed to have uniform 
distribution with minimum and maximum values of USD 20 and 30 millions respectively, 
while the variable cost was assumed to have uniform distribution with minimum and 
maximum values of 1 and 1.5 USD/barrels respectively. The production cost was also 
escalated by factor of 3% per year. While the probability distribution values of the production 
costs, both fixed and variable were based on educated guess, these values gave mean total 
production cost of around 4.31 USD/barrel. For comparison purpose, the 2006 EIA data 
showed that the average lifting cost worldwide was 4.25 USD/barrel, while for eastern 
hemisphere (not including Middle East area), the cost was 4.26 USD/barrel (EIA, 2006:34). 
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The type of hydrocarbon produced in each discovery was assumed to be oil. The production 
started in year six, where the oil yearly production was linearly increased from 50% of the 
plateau production to 100% plateau production in year 9. The yearly plateau production was 
set at 11% of the reserve. The plateau production was maintained for 2 years, afterward the 
production declined by 17.4% exponentially each year. Figure 5 shows the production profile 
in term of percentage of the total reserve.  
 
Oil price probability was assumed to have triangular probability distribution with most likely 
value of 21 USD per barrel. The minimum and maximum prices were set at 9 and 76 USD per 
barrel respectively. This distribution was based on the approximation of actual yearly 
historical US crude oil price distribution since 1974 (after the historical OPEC embargo) 
adjusted to 2004 USD value. The oil price was escalated by 3% per year. 
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The ratio of contractor’s Net Cash Flow to its Exploration cost was used to calculate the 
approximate probability distribution of the number of contracts signed each year in aggregate 
combined contracts analysis below. 
 
Aggregate combined contracts analysis 
 
To analyse whether the increase in exploration activity associated with tax consolidation were 
beneficial to the GOI, another Monte Carlo simulation was evaluated. This time, the analysis 
was not based on single commercial contract; rather, the analysis was performed on the 
combined contracts basis; all total contracts in Indonesian frontier area are consolidated into 
one. The simulation was done for two scenarios; tax consolidation with 65/35 contractor 
production sharing split, and production sharing split 55/45 without tax consolidation, i.e. the 
tax consolidation scenario and increasing production split scenario. 
 
The assumptions used in addition to the ones explained in the previous section were as below. 
 
The analysis were limited to only the additional areas signed during the first 10 years since tax 
consolidation or increase in production split (55/45) started to be effective. While the number 
of contracts signed each year under tax consolidation scenario was assumed to have triangular 
probability distribution with, 
a) Tax consolidation case (production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation): most 
likely value of 3, minimum and maximum values of 0 and 6 respectively. 
b) Progressive improved production split case (production sharing split 55/45 without 
tax consolidation): most likely, minimum and maximum values were set up at ratio of 
NCF/CE of production split 55/45 case to NCF/CE of tax consolidation case times its 
each value in tax consolidation case. 
 
The success probability of commercial discovery of each contract was assumed to be normally 
distributed, with mean 12.5% and P5 of 14.51; this value was set up at historical average ratio 
of producing PSC contract to total PSC contract signed during 1966 – 2003 in Indonesia. 
Assuming that the minimum commercial reserve discovery in frontier area was 150 million 
barrels (ConocoPhillips, 2004); the probability reserves size was assumed to have Pareto 
distribution with location 150 million barrels and P5 of 450 million barrels. 
 
The total exploration cost described previously was applied only to contracts in which 
hydrocarbon reserves were discovered (whether commercial or non-commercial). If there 
were no discovery made, the exploration cost would only be 2/3 of the total exploration cost 
of contract with discovery, distributed in the first two years of the contract. The above 
assumption was made in consideration that if there were discovery after the drilling of the first 
few wells there would be more exploration activity to delineate and determine the reserve size 
and its commerciality. While if there were no discovery after the first few wells, then 
exploration activity was stopped. 
 
The outcomes considered in this Monte Carlo simulation were the aggregate GOI and 
contractor’s NPV@25% and IRR as well as the reserve addition. It means that the cash flows 
of all possible contracts were combined into single cash flow to determine the aggregate 
NPV@25% and IRR. Similar to the single contract simulation, it was assumed that the tax 
reduction was the GOI cash outflow/investment, so that the GOI’s IRR could be calculated. 
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Results and findings 
 
Single commercial contract analysis  results 
 
To properly characterize the possible outcomes of the six scenarios, the simulations/trials were 
repeated 10,000 times. The results of the six scenarios are showed in Figure 6 to Figure 8. The 
histograms of the base case (65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation) are 
presented in Figure 9. The histograms for other scenarios had similar shapes but with different 
values of parameters as described in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Mean NPV@25% of GOI 
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From the GOI point of view, the application of tax consolidation reduced its mean GOI-
NPV@25% by 13% from 375 million USD to 327 million USD in the base case, while the 
increase in production sharing split reduced it to 347 USD million, a reduction of around 7%. 
The mean of GOI-IRR in production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation case is 
75.75%, a good and healthy value. However, this also meant some financial risk to the 
government, considering the fact that in the production split scenario, the GOI-IRR was 
undefined; there was no financial risk to the GOI. 
 
Figure 10 and Table 3 show probability distribution of the ratio of (Net Cash 
Flow/Exploration Cost) of the base case, 65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation, 
and 55/45 production sharing split without tax consolidation to the base case (Net Cash 
Flow/Exploration Cost) from the Monte Carlo simulation. Naturally, the ratio for the base case 
was 1, while the ratio values of 65/35 production sharing split with tax consolidation, and 
55/45 production sharing split without tax consolidation were 1.63 and 1.17 respectively. This 
suggests that the application of tax consolidation will potentially give contractor 1.63 times 
more net cash flow for each dollar spent in exploration, on the other hand improvement in 
production sharing split to 55/45 will increase it by only 1.2 times. Direct comparison between 
the two cases also shows that tax consolidation case will potentially gave almost 1.4 times as 
much as the case with production sharing split increase for each dollar spent in exploration.  
This value would be used to approximate the number of contracts signed in the aggregate 
contract analysis mentioned in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Histograms of ratio contractor’s net cash flow to its exploration cost for tax 
consolidation scenarios 
 
With the assumptions as described above, on the basis of single commercial contract, the 
results suggest that from the point of view of contractor, tax consolidation application was 
more attractive incentive than progressive improvement in production sharing split from 65/35 
to 55/45. Hence, it was more likely to increase the level of exploration investment. However, 
it came with more penalties, and more importantly, the tax consolidation application came 
with more risk to the GOI than the increasing production sharing split scenario. 
 
Aggregate combined contracts analysis results 
 
The analysis in the previous section shows that tax consolidation can potentially be more 
attractive incentive to the contractor than progressive improvement in production sharing split 
to increase the level of E&P investment in Indonesia. However, it came at a price to the 
government, as it posed risk and reduced the NPV and cash flow share of GOI in a single 
contract basis. To assess whether the increase in exploration investment (thus more contracts 
signed) would eventually generate more aggregate NPV for the government, analysis on the 
aggregate level was performed by Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the aggregate combined contract analysis was limited to only the 
additional areas signed during the first 10 years since tax consolidation (production sharing 
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split 65/35 with tax consolidation) application or increase in production sharing split to 55/45 
starts to be effective. While the number of contracts signed each year under tax consolidation 
scenario was assumed to have triangular probability distribution with: 
a) Tax consolidation case (production sharing split 65/35 with tax consolidation): most 
likely value of 3 and minimum and maximum values of 0 and 6 respectively.   
b) Progressive improved production split case (production sharing split 55/45 without 
tax consolidation): most likely value of 2 and minimum and maximum values of 0 
and 4 respectively. 
 
The most likely value of 3 and 2 in cases a) and b) respectively were obtained based on the 
ratio of (Net Cash Flow/Exploration Cost) of the respective cases. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the ratio between the two cases from the single contract analysis was found 
to be around 1.4. This ratio was then used to approximate the ratio of likelihood of the number 
of contracts between the 2 cases (3 and 2, or ratio of 1.5). 
 
The simulation results after 10,000 trials are presented in Table 4and Table 5. The results 
show that, under the assumption of the number of additional contracts mentioned above, tax 
consolidation application can potentially add more than 700 million STB of reserve, almost 
doubling the potential reserve addition from production split increase scenario (425 millions 
STB). However, the mean GOI IRR was only around 22%, less than the minimum required 
rate of return high-risk investment as suggested by Jones (30%). Consequently the mean and 
median of GOI NPV@25% were negative (minus 35 millions USD and minus 108 millions 
USD respectively. In contrast, in the production split improvement case, the mean and the 
median GOI NPV@25% were USD 252 and USD 185 millions respectively.  
 
Figures 11 to 13 show the histograms and the cumulative distributions of the GOI’s 
NPV@25% and IRR. They show that in tax consolidation case, the probability of the GOI’s 
NPV@25% lower than zero or equivalently the probability of the IRR to be lower than 25% 
was around 60%. This suggests that application of tax consolidation, under assumptions 
specified in this study, was a high-risk decision for the GOI 
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Figure 11:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s NPV@25% of tax 
consolidation scenario 
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Figure 12:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s IRR of tax consolidation 
scenario 
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From contractor’s views, the mean aggregate of NPV@25% in both tax consolidation and 
production split improvement scenarios were negative, while the mean aggregate IRR were 
10.3% and 7.9% respectively. These suggest that the tax consolidation application could 
increase the contractor’s IRR. However, the contractor’s IRR as an aggregate was relatively 
low, even with tax consolidation applied, indicating that the investment was not very 
attractive. It can be concluded that under the assumptions used in this study, the application of 
tax consolidation poses high risk to the government. Hence the application of tax 
consolidation was not likely to be beneficial. 
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Figure 13:  Histogram and cumulative distribution of GOI’s NPV@25% of production 
sharing split improvement case scenario 
 
Under the assumptions described in the study, following conclusions are reached:  
1) From contractor’s financial aspect, tax consolidation was more attractive incentive 
compared to increase in production sharing split. It did not only give higher 
NPV@25% but also reduced the exploration risk. 
2) Tax consolidation was less attractive to the GOI, not only it reduced GOI’s 
NPV@25% but it also posed financial risk to the GOI. 
3) The application of tax consolidation at the aggregate level posed high risk to the 
GOI; hence, unless, the potential additional reserves and potential effects to local 
economy development outweighed the risk, the application of tax consolidation is not 
likely to be beneficial.  
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Table 1: Assumptions in Tax-consolidation simulation (BP MIGAS, 2004 and Petrominer, 2004) 
 
 
MODEL 
The Indonesian PSC financial model  
PSC CONTRACT TYPE 
The Fifth Incentives Package (the highest figures) 
1 Signature bonus 26.6 million USD 
2 Minimum Exploration commitment 140.9 million USD during the first three operation 
years 
3 FTP 10% all for GOI 
4 Depreciation 5 years DDBL 
5 Investment Credit 102.14% 
6 Contractor production sharing split 35% 
7   - DMO quantity 25% of contractor production share 
8   - DMO holiday price 5 years 
9   - DMO Price 25% of export price 
10 Tax rate 44% 
SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTION 
No Item Assumption Remark 
11 Tax consolidation 
application  
Strictly to cover exploration cost in frontier areas only 
12 Analysis was limited 
to 
The additional contracts signed in 
the first 10 years after tax 
consolidation was issued. 
Historical showed that each PSC 
generation effectively used around 10 
years after that changed to other 
generation. 
13 Duration of contract  30 years Duration PSC contract life cycle. 
14 Period of analysis 2004 –2033 period  
15 Discount rate and 
discount date 
25% 
1/1/2004 
The minimum required rate of return of 
high risk petroleum E&P investment 
(Jones, 1993). 
INPUT VARIABLES ASSUMPTIONS 
16 Exploration cost/area Uniform probability distribution 
with minimum and maximum value 
of 140.9 and maximum of 200 
million USD. All values were at 
2004 value. 
The minimum value was set up at the 
minimum exploration commitment as 
stated in the IP5 terms (140.9 million 
USD for the first three contract), while 
the maximum value was set up at 
roughly three times the historical 
maximum exploration expenditures cash 
out in 2003 (BP Migas, 2004).  
17 Development 
expenditures/barrel 
Uniform probability distribution 
between 6 to 9 USD/barrel, in 
which 50% was capital 
expenditures. 
The minimum value was set up at the 
2004’s average of development cost of 
24 US petroleum companies that 
operated in other eastern hemisphere 
(except Middle East), while the 
maximum value was set up at the 2004’s 
average of development cost of world 
operation of 24 US petroleum companies 
(EIA, 2006:34). If there was commercial 
discovery that covers year 4 to year 8. 
18 Escalation of cost rate   3% / year Average of the changes of US Consumer 
Price Index during 1990 – 2003 period 
19 Fixed production cost Uniform probability distribution 
with minimum and maximum 
values of 20 and 30 million USD. 
Educated guess. The combination of 
fixed and variable operating cost give 
mean of total operating cost of 4.31 
USD/barrel in line with 2004 EIA data 
(EIA, 2006: 34). 
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20 Variable production 
cost 
Uniform probability distribution 
between 1.0 to 1.5 USD/barrel. 
See above 
21 Year production start Year 6  
22 Hydrocarbon produced Oil  
23 Production profile trend Constant plateau rate for first three 
years of production then decline 
exponentially. 
Plateau rate set to 11% of reserve. Initial 
decline rate 17.4 %/year 
24 Oil price Triangular distribution with 
minimum, mode and maximum 
values of 9, 21 and 76 USD /barrel, 
in 2004 value. 
Approximation of historical US crude oil 
price during 1974 – 2003 period, 
adjusted to 2004 value. 
25 Oil Price escalation 3%/year 
 
Average changes of historical US crude 
oil price during 1974 – 2003 period . 
OUTPUT VARIABLES 
26 GOI view: GOI’s NPV@25%, IRR and reserves addition value and probability distribution 
27 Contractor view: Contractor’s NPV@25% and IRR value and probability distribution 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of GOI-IRR for tax consolidation scenarios 
Statistics IRR-GOI – with Tax Consolidation 
 Split 55/45 Split 60/40 Split 65/35 
Mean 74.31% 75.03% 75.75% 
Median 71.40% 72.12% 72.85% 
Mode --- --- --- 
Standard Deviation 16.85% 17.00% 17.20% 
Variance 2.84% 2.89% 2.96% 
Minimum 39.71% 39.55% 39.38% 
Maximum 175.64% 180.73% 176.42% 
Range Width 135.93% 141.18% 137.04% 
 
 
 
Table 3: The ratio contractor’s NPV@25% to its exploration cost 
Statistics Split 65/35 Split 65/35 with Taxconso Split 5545 
Trials 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Mean 1.00 1.63 1.17 
Median 1.00 1.63 1.17 
Mode 1.00 --- --- 
Standard Deviation 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Minimum 1.00 1.54 1.04 
Maximum 1.00 1.75 1.23 
Range Width 0.00 0.21 0.19 
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Table 4: Aggregate Monte Carlo simulation summary for tax consolidation scenario 
 
Statistics Reserve NPV-GOI IRR-GOI NPV-PSC IRR-PSC 
Mean 716,338,520 (34,824,952) 22.23% (613,898,134) 10.33% 
Median 665,356,438 (108,612,062) 21.89% (609,571,664) 10.70% 
Mode 0 0    
Standard Deviation 430,322,113 363,026,952 11.16% 170,609,668 5.49% 
Variance 2.E+17 1.E+17 1.25% 3.E+16 0.30% 
Minimum 0 (743,367,579) -6.25% (1,693,400,920) -9.90% 
Maximum 2,756,223,012 2,661,762,388 84.93% 390,092,512 31.14% 
Range Width 2,756,223,012 3,405,129,966 91.18% 2,083,493,431 41.04% 
 
 
 
Table 5: Aggregate Monte Carlo simulation summary for production sharing split increase 
scenario 
 
Statistics Reserve NPV-GOI NPV-PSC IRR-PSC 
Mean 426,604,047 252,004,050 (644,331,019) 7.92% 
Median 372,586,054 184,733,801 (644,746,388) 8.07% 
Mode 0 0   
Standard Deviation 332,825,229 260,633,272 169,762,552 5.84% 
Variance 1.11.E+17 6.78.E+16 2.88.E+16 0.34% 
Minimum 0 0 (1,487,165,140) -12.40% 
Maximum 2,381,082,061 2,573,900,429 289,158,210 29.47% 
Range Width 2,381,082,061 2,573,900,429 1,776,323,349 41.88% 
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